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Linda Zagzebski defines epistemology as “the philosophical study of knowing and other desirable ways of believing and attempting to find truth.” 1
Epistemology is not “knowing” per se, but the study of knowledge for the sake of better knowing — in the same way that understanding auto mechanics can make one a better Formula 1 driver, understanding understanding helps us to more
efficiently weed out error from our beliefs and our reasons for holding those beliefs, as well as makes us better inquirers in future opportunities for judging truth from error. 2
Often considered the running back for metaphysics — that which gets the mind to reality, and consequently, concerned deeply with skepticism, perception, subjectivity, the psychology of knowing, religious knowing, certainty, the different kinds of knowledge, whether or not we can know anything, and all other issues related to the definitions and problems of knowledge.
One key distinction in epistemology is that between realism (the view that what we perceive is real) and solipsism (the view that we are locked in our own minds). 3
This example highlights multiple epistemological interests simultaneously: psychology, perception, the subject-object distinction, and the mind-world relationship — all with clearly overlapping interest in the nature and process of knowing anything, from an apple on a table to the God-concept. 4
↑1 | Linda Zagzebski, On Epistemology (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth: 2009), 1. |
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↑2 | Robert Audi: “The more we know about the constitution of knowledge and justification, the better we can build them through our own inquiries, and the less easily we will fall into the pervasive temptation to take an imitation to the real thing.” Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1998), 11. |
↑3 | “The doctrine of methodological solipsism says that a thinker can be understood completely in terms of the internal properties of his mind. His environment is psychologically relevant only insofar as it affects his mind.” Roy Sorensen, “Formal Problems About Knowledge” in Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 566 [539-568]. |
↑4 | Thomas Nagel briefly critiques solipsism through the process of abstraction in his infamous work: “When we conceive of the minds of others, we cannot abandon the essential factor of a point of view: instead we must generalize it and think of ourselves as one point of view among others. The first stage of objectification of the mental is for each of us to be able to grasp the idea of all human perspectives, including his own, without depriving them of their character as perspectives. It is the analogue for minds of a centerless conception of space for physical objects, in which no point has a privileged position.” Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 20. |
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